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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GLENN C. ANDERSON
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

D. A. OSGUTHORPE, AFTON OSGUTHORPE, his wife, DELBERT
OSGUTHORPE, CLARENCE OSGUTHORPE and HELEN OSGUTHORPE, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.

12893

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent, the record owner of a parcel
of land in Summit County, Utah, instituted an action to
quiet title in him. Appellants, who had possession of said
land, claimed ownership by adverse possession, boundary
by acquiescence and prescriptive easement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding, entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
D. A. Osguthorpe and Afton Osguthorpe, his wife, the
only defendants appealing, ask to have this Court reverse
the judgment granted by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent states the facts upon which the lower
court based its judgment because certain material facts
are omitted from appellants' brief. Because the Transcript
page numbers are not coordinated with the Record, the
Transcript citations will be preceded by the letter "T"
and the Record citations by the letter "R". The facts
will be set forth in numbered statements to facilitate referencing.
1. The Pre-Trial Order (R-17) established the following facts which were adopted by the lower court in
its Memorandum Decision (R-24) :

a. Plaintiff is the record owner of the property in dispute and he and his predecessors in interest have always paid the taxes on the same.
b. Defendants presently have possession of
said property in dispute and have had said possession for more than twenty years.
c. Defendants have not paid any taxes on
said property.
d. Defendants own other property contiguous to the property in dispute on the southwest
side of and adjacent to state highway 248 running
between Snyderville, Utah and Park City, Utah.
(See Defendants' Exhibit No. 1).

e. Defendants' property and the property in
dispute are separated from the highway right-ofway by a fence running parallel to the highway.
(See T-39).
f. That the property in dispute herein is situated adjacent to and bounded on one side by said
right-of-way fence and on the other by defendants'
property. (See Defendants' Exhibit No. 1).

g. Defendants have used their property only
for pasture for their livestock.
The Pre-Trial Order resolved that Appellants
were precluded from acquiring an interest in said property
by adverse possession and reserved the following two
issues for trial (R-18) :
2.

a. Whether the fence running parallel to the
highway and completely enclosing the property
claimed by plaintiff within defendants' pasture is
a boundary within the meaning of the legal doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence so that defendants have acquired title to the property in dispute herein.
b. Whether defendants' driving, trailing, and
crossing of livestock over the property in dispute
herein has given defendants a prescriptive easement to the continued use of said property in dispute without interference from plaintiff.
3. The lower court instructed defendants to proceed
with their case first because the Pre-Trial Order had established that legal title to the property was in plaintiff
(See T-3).
4. Patrick McPolin, appellants' predecessor in interest, built a fence along the highway right-of-way in
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1928 or 1929 to protect his cattle from the highway (T-12;
also see T-21).
5. In 1934, McPolin built a fence some distance inside his field, which fence was generally parallel to the
highway fence so that there was a corridor formed between
the two fences (T-17). The portion of the inside fence
which then crossed the property in dispute would be approximately as shown on the surveyor's certificate introduced in evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, T-54).
6. A stream meanders through the area between the
outside fence along the highway right-of-way and the line
where the inside fence was located as shown on the surveyor's certificate (T-18-19).
McPolin testified that the stream runs through
the property in dispute, and is "pretty crooked" (T-1819).
7.

8. McPolin trailed his cattle in the area between the
stream and the inside fence (T-18-19).
Defendants acquired the property adjacent to
the property in dispute from McPolin in 1947 (T-24).
9.

10. Defendant D. A. Osguthorpe testified that there
has never been a fence across the property in dispute since
he owned the McPolin property (T-40-41). Also see Page
31 of Osguthorpe's deposition admitted as a part of his
testimony at trial (T-60) wherein Osguthorpe was asked
the following question and gave the following answer beginning at line 21:
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Q. Was there to your knowledge ever a fence
around the property or across the property claimed
by plaintiff?
A. No.
11. Plaintiff testified that there were only the remainder of some old fence posts crossing the property in
dispute when he bought the said property in 1968 (T-5051).

12. Defendant Osguthorpe testified that the fence
he claims as the boundary by acquiescence is the fence
actually separating the property from the State Highway
right-of-way (T-39).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRETRIAL ORDER AND THE EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL FULLY SUPPORT THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONFIRM ITS JUDGMENT THAT APPELLANTS ESTABLISHED NEITHER A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE NOR A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT ACROSS RESPONDENT'S PROPERTY.
Appellants' assertions of alleged errors are basically
only two - (a) the failure of the lower court to find that
the right-of-way fence qualified as a boundary by acquiescence, and (b) the failure of the lower court to
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find that appellants had used a clearly defined path for
the prescriptive period.
A party to a quiet title action who asserts an affirmative defense against the owner of the legal title must establish that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 Pac. 262 (1922).
Under the boundary by acquiescence doctrine, the claimed
boundary in dispute must separate the properties of adjoining land owners. Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237,
322 P. 2d 391 (1958).
Appellants claim that the highway right-of-way fence
is a boundary by acquiescence and that they consequently
own all of respondent's property. The right-of-way fence
is not a common boundary between appellants' and respondent's respective properties. Where appellants' property is next to the fence, the said fence separates appellants' property from State property, and where the fence
passes in front of the _property in dispute, it separates
respondent's property from State property. Contrary to
appellants' argument, there is no evidence whatever of
a common fence between appellants' and respondent's
respective properties. The lower court's Finding that
there was no such common boundary fence was fully supported by the evidence.
It is clear that the boundary by acquiescence doctrine cannot apply to the highway fence running between
respondent's land and the government right-of-way. D. A.
Osguthorpe admitted that the property on the outside of
the claimed boundary fence belonged to the State (T-39).
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McPolin said that the highway fence was constructed
along the right-of-way to keep his cattle off the highway
(T-12). It certainly was not constructed as or intended
to be a boundary between McPolin's land and the land
of any other nongovernmental person (T-20-21).
Because McPolin testified that he did not intend
anything when he built the fence, (T-20-21) the lower
court's finding that McPolin had no intent to make a
boundary line was justified. Appellants complain that
there was insufficient evidence to warrant the lower
court's finding of McPolin's intent, or lack thereof, when
he constructed the right-of-way fence. Even if McPolin
had intended that the highway fence was to be the boundary to his property, it would not help appellants because
the fence still would not be a boundary between appellants' property and respondent's property. Under the
present circumstances where appellants had the burden
of proving that the said right-of-way fence was the boundary between their property and respondent's property,
they should not be heard to complain that there was insufficient evidence. The lower court was entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence before it.
Appellants next contend that· the lower court erred
in finding that "There has not been a fence across said
property in dispute during the time that Defendants have
had possession thereof." On T-41, D. A. Osguthorpe, in
answer to the question about a fence across the disputed
property, stated, "There has never been a fence since I
owned the ranch." Appellants also adopted as their testi-
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mony at trial, D. A. Osguthorpe's admission on page 31
of his deposition that there never had been a fence across
said property (T-60) . On page 15 of their brief, appellants
admit that D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony appeared to be
inconsistent about the existence of the inside fence across
the property in dispute. The lower court's Finding was
clearly proper.
In support of a prescriptive easement appellants
argue that the lower court incorrectly found that appellants had not established a precise trail or path across
respondent's property for any determined period of time.
To establish the claimed path as a prescriptive easement
across the said property, the location of both the inside
fence and the stream needed to be fixed by appellants to
give the claimed path some definitive dimensions.
Appellants assert that the stream does not flow across
the property in dispute. Appellants' own witness, McPolin, contradicted Osguthorpe by testifying that the
stream flowed through the said property (T-18-19). There
was no specific evidence of the exact location of the stream
in relation to the property in dispute. The evidence supports the lower court's Findings that appellants did not
establish those critical elements. As noted above, appellants had the burden and did not sustain it.
A person may not acquire a prescriptive easement
across the property of another except for a defined track
or way. 25 Am. Jur. 2d §63. Variation from the traveled
track before the prescriptive period is completed arrests
the running of the required time. Bolton v. Murphy, 41

Utah 591, 127 Pac. 335 (1912). Moreover, it has been
held that an intention to acquire the right to use a particular path across the property of another is an element
in determining whether a prescriptive easement has been
established. See Predham v. Holfester, 108 A. 2d 458
(N. J. 1954).
Appellants claim all of respondent's land by prescriptive easement. Such a claim is not only improper
under the law as it applies in this case but is not supported by the evidence. Appellants' claim to have driven
their cattle across the same path McPolin used, but
Osguthorpe testified that there was no fence across respondent's land. If there was during appellants' ownership no such fence which had been earlier used by McPolin as one side of a particular cattle path to insure that
the cattle stayed on said path, then appellants have not
shown that their cattle were either restricted to or used
the same path McPolin may have used.
McPolin testified that he drove his cattle on the
inside of the stream away from the highway and that the
stream meandered through respondent's property (See
T-18-19). McPolin did not know exactly how far the
meanders extended into respondent's land (T-19-20). BeOsguthorpe said there was no fence across responproperty (which fence would have kept the cattle
on a relatively definite path) then appellants may have
been driving their cattle on their own property and not
on respondent's at all. Thus, appellants cannot have sus-
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tained their burden that they used the same track that
McPolin used. McPolin used his path for thirteen years
at most.
In addition, because Osguthorpe said there was no
fence across respondent's land, appellants cannot have
sustained their burden of showing continuous use over
the same clearly defined track for a period of twenty
years as is required by law. See Lunt v. Kitchens, 123
utah 488, 260 p. 2d 535 ( 1953) .
Osguthorpe testified that he did not know respondent's land existed until the past two years (T-30). Osguthorpe said that he erected several cross fences extending
in his property (T-31-32), but he did not say which direction the said fences crossed his own property or
whether the fences interrupted the area in which the
claimed path was situated. Appellants did not show by
any evidence exactly where the path was located over
which they allegedly drove their cattle or what its dimensions were.
Since Osguthorpe did not even know respondent's
property existed or where it was located in relation to
appellants' own until the last two years (See T-27), appellants cannot have had an intention to acquire an easement across respondent's property and certainly not over
a particular path. In addition, the pre-trial stipulation
that appellants used their own land only to pasture their
cattle certainly negates any intention to acquire an easement and also derogates from their claim that they used
respondent's land as a defined path for their cattle.
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Appellants' claim that they have acquired all of respondent's land by prescriptive easement was clearly not
supported by the purported proof. It is submitted that
under any view of the facts appellants wholly failed to
sustain their burden of proof to show a prescriptive easement.
CONCLUSION
This Court has repeatedly held that it views the record in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial
court. See Jardine v. Brunswick, 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.
2d 659 (1967). It is submitted that the evidence fully
supports the lower court's Findings of Fact and interpretation of applicable law. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER P. FABER, JR.
WATKINS & FABER
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the foregoing Brief on George M. McMillan, and Paul L. Badger,
McMillan & Browning, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, at Suite 1020 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101, by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 21st
day of July, 1972.
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